

19 Aug 78

With Dave Delbig:

1. "you want total disarmament: but you want to do it in a way that works — i.e. that does not increase the prob. of nuclear war... ["if I believed that certain ways would increase danger — which I don't. "
2. [DE: "Total unilateral disarmament without any reciprocation is as impossible as
 - "Disarmament with no possibility of rearmament;
 - "Irreversible forgetting of poss. of fission;
 - "Making fission/fusion impossible."

[Bergelson, Class of '36; served a year starting Sept '39 for refusal to Register (mandated by Reichswehr Reichsbank); 2 years for refusal to serve, in '41.

3. Process of disarm. could not
continue to approach closer to zero
if other countries made no positive
response to

- US announcement of goal
of total mutual disarm.

- US initiatives toward that
position of zero nuclear weapons
for US (or elsewhere)

- Statement that any use is
intensely evil

4. Even if one believes (Dallin) that
"no 2d use" doctrine is safe
(safer than alternatives) and should
be implemented, one can recognize
consequences of fact that others do not
agree — advocate + organize for
moves that are possible — i.e. the
case — and unful.

Ash

Ask for Law: NFO

Note: Int. Law, Summary

Call now for: Dinos, TDA US FU
calling for General Strike
{ Investigation

NFO

David Pius Propose Freeze + NFO

" SC " !

" NATO, TW "

ALONG WITH END

+ anti-prolif.

Aug 15, 1983

What keeps the arms race going is (a) the US Presidents' determination to press our technological advantage and to increase the credibility of US threats to initiate or escalate limited nuclear war, thereby increasing the credibility of threats and the effectiveness in practice of US interventionary forces to maintain our global sphere of influence (not only, or even mainly, against Soviets or against "aggression" by others, nor involving Soviet support to our opponents).

(b) SU unwillingness to go beyond proposals or expressions of willingness to end the arms race to put pressure on the US government by unilateral measures, or by restraint in imitating US technological pursuit of weapons designed for first-strike or escalation. The probable causes: SU military suspicions of arms control and of US motives, desires for damage-limiting and for escalation threats similar to those of the US, at least so long as the US will not end the arms race; and determination not to appear to accept a subordinate role, either by "inferiority" or by making unilateral concessions.

June 6, 1980:

--Understand/explain Counterforce, its requirements and rationale, and its relation to FU threats, in view of likelihood that Reagan will call for:

B-1;

ABM?

more cruise missiles: sea-launched?

more small nuclear submarines: attack, for ASW?

stationary MX, with 20 vertical shelters per missile~~x~~
(with ABM?)

(Will the 1980's be the Decade of Proliferation (and first use?)
If so, disarmament will have have vanished, through this "window";
the chance will have been missed to demonstrate superpower willingness
and determination to reverse the arms race and move toward the
de-legitimation, switch from dependence (on weapons and threats),
reduction and eventual abolition of nuclear weapons (with corresponding
measures with respect to war) before the number of sources and users
of nuclear weapons moved from ^C7_{x6} (with ~~xxxxx~~, Britain, France closely
tied to US decision-making) to 30 or more. We might say, this may
be the ~~xxxx~~ last year left for this opportunity; and it is clearly
not going to be used. The new weapons probably won't be on the shelves
of the next half dozen countries till 1983 or 1984...

((Comparison: the Soviets, by postponing their missile deployment
till 1962, "missed" the "window" during which our retaliatory forces
were significantly vulnerable to missiles. By which I inferred they
were ~~xxx~~ not seeking a first-strike threat or capability...))

((the 1970's were The Decade of MIRV, to achieve which even
SALT was put off till 1980, if ever; or rather, arms reduction was
put off indefinitely...at least till SALTII runs out in 1985, or
till the end of the '80's. No later than 1973, Israel assembles
its weapons (see CIA report 1974); India explodes bomb; Taiwan ready
by 1979 (related to ~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~ normalization with China? see NYT
on CIA report); South Africa test in 1978? (N-bomb?) German deal

with Brazil, Argentina; Pakistan; Iraq...

TALK (URPE?/ Feb 14, 1981

Three points. If I had two hours, I think I could make them persuasively; in twenty minutes, I can only assert them, and hope they'll enter your thinking as possibilities, hypotheses, possible ways of understanding what's going on.

1. Strategic and tactical nuclear weapons bought by US leaders in part because they are seen as usable and useful, partly on the basis of experience of having used them, often successfully. Threat of nuclear first use and of escalation, up to first strike, to enable US to assert US interests, backed up by forceful intervention, right up to the borders of Russian occupation, despite Russian non-nuclear superiority in regions near that perimeter including the Middle East (or Chinese conventional superiority in Far East and SEA).

Hence, need for Superiority at all levels; measured, since Russians acquired sizeable nuclear forces (and especially since they began hardening them) in counterforce capability and intrawar deterrence capabilities.

Hence, weapons requirements are not only coupled to Russian military buildup--generating an arms race--but arms agreements (unless they guaranteed the US a decisive superiority) & cutting off US tests and new deployments are to be avoided. Claims that US Presidents want no more than parity, and want to end the arms race if that is attainable by agreement, are lies.

Note past and current threats.

2. Soviets are part of the problem, and always have been. But two phases: Stalin/Khrushchev, where their contribution was (only) to: deny the US a monopoly; hold on to satellites, with help of forces large enough to pose a potential threat to West Europe; make major bluffs exaggerating the size of their forces and advances in technology; make nuclear threats on the basis of bluff; plan and exercise invasions of West Europe--as a deterrent to strategic attack, and as an aspect of war-fighting if deterrence failed.

(b) since 1964--or perhaps since 1961, including missiles to Cuba, to imitate US buildup, eventually (1967-72) in hardened missiles and subs, a second-strike retaliatory, Type I deterrent capability; then to imitate counterforce, escalatory capability, since 1973-74 (deployed since 1975), roughly equivalent to current US counterforce capability soon.

(This can have a "legitimate" objective, other than deliberate first strike: of deterring nuclear first use, or US escalation, by threat of matching it or escalating still further, even, if necessary, up to a desperate, preemptive first strike ((since they lack anything like the "excellent first strike capability" that US had till mid-60's, or even the moderately good first strike capability, against both subs and missiles that US had in 1967 and which the US proposes to regain, unilaterally --thus restoring Superiority-- by MX and Trident in late '80s or earlier with Minuteman improvement.

However "legitimate" by ~~xxx~~ the standards of US and other national aims, the SU policy has, in fact, facilitated and stimulated the arms race & has not served Soviet national security (any more than the decision to put missiles in Cuba did so).

Note that if this analysis of the arms ~~xx~~ race and US motives is correct, the Russians have rarely contributed to our understanding of it. They have not revealed past US secret threats; nor pointed out the central reliance of the US on nuclear threats, in a persuasive fashion. Perhaps they have been inhibited from doing so by an unwillingness to admit to the possibility of being deterred or coerced by US threats of FU or escalation, or to past examples of US success in this. Thus their behavior, in acquiring a war-fighting capability themselves, is at best ambiguous, amounting to some extent to an endorsement and legitimation of US efforts. (and certainly, a ~~xxxxx~~ stimulus).

Since 1964, their pursuit of parity (instead of minimum deterrence) and of counterforce (instead of deterrence only) has almost surely worsened their security: especially the latter phase, which may have been encouraged by the apparent benefits toward an ABM agreement--of the earlier progress to parity in retaliatory capability.

Thus, we can't rely for liberation from the arms race on Russian aims or competence.

Especially since the "progress" to an escalatory capability, on top of conventional modernization, one can't confidently extrapolate from past SU caution and passivity beyond their borders to the certainty that they will not imitate past US behavior more aggressively in Third World regions, or even in crisis menaces to Europe, on the basis of their unprecedentedly large and equivalent forces. Even first-use threats (as against China), or actual combat ~~use~~ (Afghanistan) cannot be ruled out.

2. Socialists and leftists have tended to neglect the arms race problem, as reflecting only US motives (in part, on basis of past period in which US was overwhelmingly powerful, hence almost exclusively responsible: while ~~xxxxx~~ ignoring significance of SU occupation of East Europe); and as being "only technical," thereby actually partaking of "progress" and posing no fundamental or partly autonomous threat or problem. ("Technology can do no wrong; and either the SU can do no wrong, ~~xx~~ or else, it is so subordinate in power that it is restricted indefinitely to reaction and passivity.)

3. (Wheelis point) The history that has led us here can be read, with great validity and close approximation, as a history of mechanism, of behavior strongly motivated by a power structure that is unchangeable, unchallengeable and even uninfluenceable, at least in the short run and short of revolutionary ~~xxxx~~ conflict; of behavior corresponding so closely to high-odds predictability as to be regardable as ~~xxx~~ inevitable.

Or it can be read otherwise: with the recurrent theme of Lying and Secrecy as an ~~xx~~ indication of belief by the leaders, possibly correct, that Democracy informed by much better awareness of the reality seen by these same leaders and stimulated into political action would have pressed in a different direction, perhaps successfully. THINGS COULD BE WORSE, AND MORE IRREVERSIBLE: AND WOULD BE, EXCEPT FOR PAST STRUGGLES, AND VALUES IN THE PUBLIC

40 1981, not 1983

mine
(1959)

(VNPB on VN)

Q7, work begins the ^(VPO or VN) could have had consequences

The prospective uses of these weapons, both strategic and

2.

tactical, involve the defense of U.S. interests in Europe, the Middle East, and the Far East; before long, probably Africa; and eventually, perhaps, Latin America. ~~xx~~ Concern for the deterrence of attack on the U.S. itself arises primarily from the possibility that a conflict originating in a clash of interests in one or more of these other areas might spill over, in the course of major escalation, into direct attacks on the homelands of the superpowers. (In European eyes the same is true for a ~~xxx~~ major war, or a nuclear war, in Europe; they see it as likely only as a result of an ongoing superpower clash elsewhere in the world). (In Russian eyes, from one point of view, they themselves conceive of invading Western Europe only in the desperate context of providing themselves with an ~~xx~~ alternate economic base for postwar recovery in the event that their own homeland is being or is about to be destroyed). (That conception is certainly compatible with European fears!)

The PUBLIC BELIEF THAT USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS "THINKABLE," AND THE THREAT OF THEIR USE IS CREDIBLE AND EFFECTIVE, ONLY IN THE MOST EXTREME CIRCUMSTANCES, IS SHARED BY U.S. LEADERS ~~xx~~ ONLY FOR ONE SITUATION: WHEN INITIAL USE OF NUCLEARS IS HIGHLY LIKELY TO LEAD TO A LARGE TWO-SIDED EXCHANGE, I.E., WHEN THE IMMEDIATE OPPONENT IS THE SOVIET UNION (OR EVENTUALLY, CHINA). U.S. LEADERS SECRETLY REGARD US FIRST-USE AS A REALISTIC OPTION AND A CREDIBLE (SECRET) THREAT IN A WIDE RANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES WHEN THE IMMEDIATE OPPONENT DOES NOT HAVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS, OR IS GREATLY INFERIOR (NITZ).

INDEED, U.S. WAR PLANS CONTEMPLATED A FIRST STRIKE AGAINST THE SU ITSELF FOR A WIDE RANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES UNTIL ~~xxxx~~ 1961, ~~x~~ DURING THE PERIOD OF U.S. STRATEGIC NEAR-MONOPOLY, AND MADE MAJOR PUBLIC THREATS AS LATE AS 1962 IN QUESTIONABLY "VITAL" CIRCUMSTANCES.

PRACTICALLY SPEAKING, THE ONLY ~~xx~~ OCCASIONS OTHERWISE IN WHICH THE PRESIDENTS SERIOUSLY CONSIDERED IMMINENT USE OF NUCLEARS AGAINST NON-NUCLEAR ADVERSARIES INVOLVED (1) IMMINENT TACTICAL DEFEAT OF U.S. OR ALLIED UNITS WHICH WERE SURROUNDED (CHOSIN RESERVOIR, DIENBIENPHU, QUEMOY, POTENTIALLY IN LAOS, KHE SANH, (and potential use either in support of Israeli units, or by Soviets in support of surrounded Egyptian forces, 1973); or (2) TO END A COSTLY, STALEMATED WAR ON US TERMS (Korea--considered by Truman, threatened by Ike); (Vietnam, 1969-72.

~~Byzzyzz~~ But these have arisen repeatedly ~~xxx~~ in the past (with US involvement having been encouraged by the earlier feeling of assurance that this "card" was available, and even by an exaggerated expectation of our willingness to use it if necessary) and is foreseeable in the future, especially with the planned use of the RDF. And they will arise in future ~~xx~~ involvements of other states that have, or could acquire, nuclear weapons: with no need for the leaders contemplating such involvement or use of nuclears to be more similar to Idi Amin than to our own past Presidents.

U.S. Presidents have been, in the last 35 years, as willing to contemplate the use of nuclear weapons against an opponent who did not possess them, as Harry Truman was in 1945, and with similar motives: the public one of saving US lives, the private one of demonstrating will to the Russians and others.

AJW and HK were addressing problem that:

current forces weren't enough for Type I deterrence (given their assumptions about SU: though these were tacit, and their argument supposed an "abstract enemy"...actually, one very like the US, actually, at that time and since)

forces ~~were~~ for Type I deterrence alone, weren't enough, either (even AJW talked of: ~~x~~ damage-limiting (if war came ~~by~~ accident, or false alarm, or crisis-preemption; and "crises on the periphery."!))

Both damage-limiting and type II capability are described as "insurance"--in case deterrence (sic) should fail."

Yet this insurance~~x~~ (in both contexts) can increase the incentives--on both sides--to preempt." (see my Crude Analysis; and Pallid Giant).

Question: Why has a point of view--on first-use, first-strike, counterforce, damage-limiting--that used to be limited to Herman Kahn et al, and to secret JCS/SAE planning, now become Establishment concern, dominant analysis, and policy of Pres and VP (and before Reggan, of Brz, Brown and Carter)--~~xx~~ although SU is now much stronger than 20 years ago? (when such views were sneered at by the center: see Scientific American on Kahn, JFK/LBJ distance, except for fallout-shelters and Ann Arbor.)

See Powers:
need for
(122Ked)
DD-59
in 1980
(M.)
Schles:
perceptions
Hyp: a) The investment needed to destroy SU hardened shelters can't be done "covertly" (whereas ASW, apparently, can be). Like 1965 in Vietnam, when JCS wanted to mobilize (in a Cold War that would have sunk Great Society--which is no longer a competitor); or 1968, when sending more troops would have forced mobilization (and sunk LBJ renomination--which went under anyway) (worse, it would have hurt balance of payments and gold flow).

MX; Trident II, plutonium, N-bomb (controversial), cruise and Pershing (controversial in Europe and SU); maybe ABM (expensive and against Treaty), Civil Defense, and B-1. Maybe gas.

(b) Need for "more Vietnams": but now, after VN, with earlier consideration of nuclear weapons; especially after Fall of Shah, "threat" to Saudi Arabia, Cubans in Africa, uprisings in Central America. Possible need to explode nuclears (decreasing certainty that threats will work; need for demonstration).

(c) Potential war limited to West Europe, East Europe, very limited in SU (and US?); Pershing; SS-20;

(Imagine: West Germany gets involved in satellite uprising (SU fear, if not prepared to deter); or crisis in Middle East leads to "test" in border of NATO... or Yugoslavia, or Italy...

--Previously, the size-and-inaccuracy of all U.S. nucs was a danger to the credibility of the US nuclear escalation strategy: they killed too many people (for less than vital US interests); and in so doing they increased the likelihood that the Sovs would reply with their large-and-inaccurate warheads.

But this was compensated for, up to a point, by the overall overwhelming superiority of the US, which might still deter the Sovs from matching our nuclear initiative or escalation.

Now the Sovs have parity. But the new accurate-low yield properties of the Pershing and cruise missiles offer a new hope of a limited war-fighting strategy, especially so long as the Sovs cannot reply without initiating, inescapably, attacks on cities, incurring the risks of our replying in kind.

(When Sov accuracy, in turn, improves, and if they adjust to this new capability by at ~~xxxx~~ last installing small warheads on their short and medium range missiles (the SS-20 already moves in this direction), again we would seem to have no advantage in initiating or threatening limited war.)

--We want...what we (Nitze, etc) say the Russians want (and which the Russians, in some responses, are acquiring;

The threat, or use, of a one-sided use, or escalation.
Hyp: We want (a) superiority (parity isn't good enough, or even advantageous, at higher levels, compared to present situation); (b) specifically, in counterforce and war-fighting capabilities, at every level.

Sovs want parity at every level (which is good enough for them, and all they ever expect to achieve: they do not foresee US unilateral stopping of race or unilateral disarmament as a practical possibility) (nor, even temporary US defeat in race); their counterforce efforts represent either (a) imitating US, precluding a US superiority; and/or (b) they have come to believe, convinced by US, that these ~~xxxx~~ capabilities are indeed necessary to deterrence (esp. of US! they country that most needs deterring, and the one that keeps saying just that!); or (c) to enable them to make US-like threats against small countries, even ones potentially supported by the U.S.

If deterrence is not guaranteed to be perfect...
the ~~x~~ failure of deterrence occurs at the point when one side perceives "war" (or, respectively, nuclear war, initiated by one side or the other, or escalation) as "inescapable, inevitable": especially, but not necessary, as "imminent."

Such a perception~~x~~ may quickly communicate itself to the opponent, who would then come to share it (lacking high confidence in being able to change that perception in time for the opponent). Or it may arise in an opponent because of a (perhaps false!) belief that it is held by oneself, or that it ~~xxxx~~ will presently or inevitably come to be held by oneself in the light of evolving events, given the opponent's understanding of the way one is likely to interpret and respond to those events and the expectations one will build on them.

(Pallid Giant problem). Any communication ~~xxx~~ to the effect that "under these circumstances we would regard war/nucs as inevitable, or "we believe They would regard war/nucs as necessary or inevitable..." adds to the likelihood of a false alarm.

Sigal. 3

Why is alleged "strategic inferiority" allegedly harmful to US interests?

It consists of the Soviets "having a capability we don't have": to wipe out most of its opponent's land-based missiles.

If we could do this to Soviets (as we could do with MX, or Trident II, especially both: but later than Soviets, by comparable calculations could do it to Minuteman; or considering "bias" neither side may really be able to do it until terminal guidance and MARVs are operational, which will be sooner for US, in late '80's) we would be drastically threatening/reducing their ability to retaliate at all, since 75% of their force is land-based.

But if Sovs can do it to us, at most they destroy (a large fraction of) our land-based missiles, which are only 25-30% of our force; most of our strategic force (with small warheads, by our choice--which war-fighters don't really propose to change) is at sea, and is enormously larger than needed for deterrence of nuclear attack, by any previous calculations.

((True: earlier calculations did not suppose that a Sov first-strike might leave them with an enormous advantage in deliverable megatonnage). (Nevertheless, what they would be facing is several thousand warheads).

Under circumstances when the Soviet Union is not expecting, as imminent or inevitable, a US first strike, the US retaliatory force would seem more than enough to deter attack.

What it might not deter, so reliably as in the past, is Soviet matching, retaliation in kind, to US tactical nuclear initiatives in Europe or against a Soviet ally. The Sovs might now retaliate, making for a two-sided tactical nuclear exchange, or even escalate somewhat: because of a reduced fear that this would lead the US to escalate the nuclear conflict to a level that might make the Soviets consider, in this new, desperate (and already highly destructive) situation, a ~~preemptive~~ first-strike themselves, or a pre-emptive first strike in expectation that the conflict would inevitably escalate further anyway if they postponed or decided against it.

Thus, this situation reduces the credibility of our threats to initiate tactical nuclear war, and indeed, reduces our willingness to carry out such threats. And this is evident to potential allies--reducing their willingness to accept our peacetime dominance, ~~xxxxxxxwaxkixxwxkix~~ or alliance at all (Pakistan)--as to potential insurgents, rebels, and the Soviets.

In this interval of "inferiority," the threat of First STRike would indeed be less available to the US than to the Soviets; yet the threat would be credible at most to deter certain horrendous escalations or threats by us; "unfortunately," these are threats which we rely on, and they don't (as of now).

One implication: the war-fighters lie about many of their "concerns," but not about all. (e.g. they lie when they suggest that their main concern is "avoiding inferiority"; what they need is superiority. But they don't lie about their belief that superiority is possible and worthwhile,

Jan 27, 80

Purpose of strategy/forces:

1. Nuck "defense" (deterrence; war-fighting if necessary) of:

a) NATO (no matter how conflict starts: e.g., SU fears of German involvement in a satellite conflict, or in Yugoslavia; or NATO intervention in Italy or Greece against Coms or anti-NATO forces);

b) US expeditionary forces abroad

c) other allies, or third countries.

2. Maintenance of US "influence" abroad; expansion and support of system of alliances, bases, access (overflight privileges).

3. Bottom line: "access" to cheap raw materials, cheap labor, ~~xxx~~ privileged or "equal" access to markets, profits, investments, transport facilities, in Third World;

In "second world"! predominance within Western Alliance and in capitalist West, including Latin America and Africa.

4. Domestic profits, jobs, votes, current concentration and location of domestic power (within MNCs, Exec): from producing weapons; and from "enjoying" influence abroad of this sort;

as opposed to a different world order system, of allocating and using and controlling the resources of the poor countries, the Southern Hemisphere (not merely replacing US dominance by, say, French or Russian influence);

or a system that moved globally away from reliance on nuclear weapons.

(Current system moves against human rights, everywhere; so a change is more likely to improve opportunities for human rights than worsen.)

Current system is ambivalent (or even, on balance, positive) abpit Russian buildup and even proliferation: both serve to justify US buildup and strategy and mobilize support for it.

Thus: Small porportion of US Forces--about 5%--are needed to meet deterrence of nuclear attack on the US: i.e., "essence of the U.S." (and no new forces contribute to that: or any of our land-based missiles, those eventually menaced by SU forces); in fact, our strategy for using the rest of the forces constitutes the major strain on our deterrence--the greatest threat to the U.S. itself!

Nor is; among our purposes: a) ending the arms race;

(b) maintaining "parity" (vs. U.S. superiority) with SU;

c) stopping SU buildup.

d) reversing arms race, disarming, on either side.

e) preventing proliferation (as distinct from slowing it somewhat, or managing it; as SALT manages buildup).

(e) Avoiding Contingency capabilities on both sides (Scales 7C); or "instability" pre-7C

Operational Code of the CPD/Nitze the Cold Warriors

(Sanders thesis): Nitze/Acheson (Hammond): Exaggerate SU military capability (worst case, equate capability with intentions, enlarge estimated capability on basis of assumed "inescapable militancy," equate potential capability with actual current or near-term capability, infer SU capability from actual or potential US capability...) so that the Admin and Congress and public, writing down the estimate and under-reacting to their reduced estimate, will arrive at programs that ~~wxx~~ will be adequate in terms of the actual SU threat
(see missile gap)

This approach is especially necessary because the appropriate and necessary US posture with respect to the actual SU posture is "a sufficient margin of superiority," not parity; and this cannot be said, without revealing more than is politic of actual Insiders aims and intended military means (nuclear threats, to sustain worldwide status, whatever its legitimacy, injustice, instability, etc.), and without raising questions of feasibility which could be answered only by revealing facts about SU intentions and capabilities that would be inconsistent with the "enemy" and power image that is ideologically necessary for other reasons.

Also, the need for superiority rules out the feasibility of arms limitation by agreement--though again, this cannot be explained to public in these terms.

Also, the need for superiority rests on the goal of roll-back, retrogression of Soviet influence and control even to the point of fundamental break-up of the Soviet regime itself, an essential goal (or else, fundamental change in its internal regime and policies: to be achieved by continuous tension, a wall of hostility, with the explicit risk of war: a goal less likely to be accepted by public as necessary, feasible, or legitimate). Also, the related goal of worldwide containment, everywhere along periphery of SU and everywhere in the world, reflecting zero-sum nature of conflict (concept of "enemy")

Need for nuclear threats; inability to accept NFU restriction.

Superiority--and American ~~xx~~ leadership, including foreign ~~xxxx~~ in foreign aid in the form of rearmament and deployment of US forces abroad, to integrate US and European economies (and Japanese), to restore European economies, and to maintain US exports (averting a major recession)--is needed to "contain neutralism", to prevent a domino effect of non-alignment: which would not only reduce US hegemony and dominance within the alliance but which would (in zero-sum world) enlarge Soviet influence strategically. Thus, the arms buildup--and world policeman role--which is "caused by" and which "calls for" superiority--are needed in themselves, for their effects on allies.

In ~~xxx~~ turn, allied acceptance of alliance and US hegemony is necessary to get them to accept German rearmament. ((How much direct influence on this approach came from British--who needed aid--and from German-lovers?))

NATO AS EXTENSION OF MARSHALL PLAN -- SERVING SAME POLIT. + ECON. GOALS!
(VS. NEUTRALISM)

Operational Code: superiority

It is not only that superiority is needed as a basis for the prudent use, and the credible threat, of military force (seen as the US answer to an otherwise aggressive and possible successful use of Russian political maneuvers).

The quest for superiority, the willingness to invest massive sums, is itself a vital "signal" to the Soviets--of our ~~x~~ willingness to use military force to frustrate them or their allies and proxies. This signal is just as effective even if it does not achieve its objective to significant superiority; in fact, it could be more indicative of US will if it was apparent that US leaders were undertaking this huge effort without great assurance of succeeding (1981) (although the actual achievement of superiority, if indeed it is feasible, would be much better; my point is that the indication of will could be even greater in the former case).

If Superiority were thought, by either US or SU, to be essential to the US for its nuclear threats at ~~xx~~ low levels to be credible or effective, then a non-threatening policy might seem necessary if Superiority had not yet been achieved or was infeasible. But if, rather, Superiority is merely highly useful--but not strictly essential--to the making of effective threats, then what matters is an expensive effort to achieve Superiority, showing that the decision-makers do regard Threats as highly useful, perhaps essential, and are thus willing to spend large investments "merely" to make them even stronger, even when these investments are far from likely to attain actual Superiority. Likewise, a willingness to seek Superiority in the context of an untrammelled arms competition--"Do your worst, SU"--enhances the signal of will and determination, and confidence in both will and technical competence.

Sanders (URPE Talk)

How did the CPD get its military Keynesianism accepted in 1976-81, despite the limits this time, admitted by Nitze, of inflation, energy programs, productivity problems?

A Contrary to all expectations of Sanders (and Wolf; and Chomsky?)

Answer (probably underrated by Sanders, and Jim Cypher, URPE:

The actual Soviet buildup, this time a reality, in contrast to 1949-50 and 1958-60 (when Khrushchev was actually going in the opposite direction!). This buildup, followed by Afghanistan, has had the effect of validating the claims of the CPD which Korea (and the Russian A-bomb) did in 1949-50.

Indeed, the fact that gives the lie retrospectively to the CPD claims in 1949 and 1958 is that Soviet capabilities for expanding their influence backed up by military power ~~xxx~~ were so vastly inferior to the West's and particularly to the US power that it is scarcely imaginable that dreams of expansion, let alone of world domination, entered into the Russians' calculations, even in the longest of terms. (And it is known now, by declassified documents, that this was clear to the Insiders).

But that is not self-evident now, either to Insiders or outsiders. (I.e., it is possible that the ambitions of the Soviets are somewhat closer than ever before to what US ambitions have been right along, though still surely couched in Junior Partner terms).

Also, how come Acheson, Nitze and Lovett¹¹⁰ (all Republicans; the last two, international bankers) come to be such military Keynesians, with no fear of unbalanced budgets, big government spending, export subsidy... In contrast to Louis Johnson, Taft?

Higher taxes, restrictions on credit, wage and price controls.
(Harry McPherson review of Steele's book on Lippman in Foreign Affairs, Oct 1980, says Lippman saw British influence in this Cold War policy. Note his comments to me. Were British interested specifically in new loans; in special relationship (in what dimensions?) In support for their imperial influence?

Feb 13, 1981

(Notes on Nitze, Strategy in the 1980s, Foreign Affairs, Fall 1980

((For the first time, the strategic situation is at last what was feared as an imminent development in 1949, and again in 1958-61: the Soviets have a retaliatory capability comparable to our own, a tactical and theater capability comparable to NATO's, and are likely to acquire soon a counterforce capability for the first time, comparable to our present counterforce capability (though much less than we had before about 1969, and much less than we are aiming to have in the late 1980's with MX and Trident, or sooner with Mark 12A warheads. The Russian capability will be superior to ours in the meantime against land-based missiles--about 1/3 to 1/4 of our warheads; ours is superior against their sea-based missiles, about ~~1~~ 1/3 of their warheads (90% vulnerable at port).

Nitze: ... "there can

Sanders thesis:

To be explained: What was it exactly that the Prussians saw as the adverse consequences of "neutralism"? How would their own institutional interests be affected by it, and how did this relate to their judgments of national interest? What aspects of this "catastrophe" were hardest to convey persuasively to broad mass public opinion--necessitating deceit?

How realistic were the fears of these men with respect to their own class and institutional interests?

Given the costs, the effects on society of militarization, the risks, the foregone opportunities, the offensive nature of their aims (and the oppressive and illegitimate nature of the worldwide status quo that was truly to be "defended") with respect to Soviet influence had to be concealed, behind a stance of "military defense of the US and European allies against a military threat."

But why the offensive strategy? How urgent? What did they see as the eventual costs, the risks, the prospects of success, the relative rewards? How realistic?

Moreover, if US response was to be military--an arms buildup both for "signalling," for economic reasons at home and within the alliance, and as backup for low-level offensive action, along with actual military threats and interventions--then the threat had to be portrayed to the public as military, to appear legitimate (and worthwhile): given the naive view of the public that military responses were to be reserved for military challenges. and that militarization and military investment was to be avoided and minimized.

Sanders notes. Introduction

Sanders refers to competing "doctrines" among elites as instruments for capturing support of public via coherence with public "ideology." But he doesn't face how these different doctrines, ~~xxxxxxx~~ cohere with differing elite interests or perceptions of the national interest (and where the latter differ, he doesn't explain the systematic basis for the differences).

It seems necessary to distinguish between, for a given faction, its "public doctrine" which it expounds to a large audience, and its elite or esoteric, privately-expounded and perhaps privately-held "doctrine," closer to its "sincere" convictions. The former is indeed only loosely coupled to the latter and may be cynically and deceptively crafted as an instrument of manipulating public acceptance. But the latter may be quite sincere (even if still incomplete, or embodying premises not entirely conscious) and does pose the further question of why it has come to be held, by this particular group (and not by other groups of elites, or not at other times or circumstances). Sanders never addresses this latter question, though the distinction between types of "doctrine" is implicit in his exposition.

Thus, Nitze bases his public argument on the "need to avert SU superiority, the defense of the US against SU attacks or threats"; but his rationale to more narrowly professional audiences is based on his (undoubtedly sincere) belief in the need for US superiority, mainly in order to dominate confrontations arising outside Europe, or spilling over into Europe. His proposals, while purporting to meet the first objective, actually go much further to implement the second objective precisely, so far as technology allows.

But why does Nitze believe this, with the backing he has, while Warnke and his institutional and corporate allies does not? Also, one must consider how shifting external events--including the behavior and capabilities of the Soviets--help one side or the other in the argument, this bearing ~~xxxxxxx~~ both on the public argument and the elite argument.

Two points, then: a) ~~xxxxx~~ Inside Doctrines, in contrast to Outside Doctrines, are more closely related to insiders actual convictions, rather than being merely expedient slogans to capture public support for a policy, so that the relation of these doctrines to differences in elite interests and to external events is worthy of investigation;

see Sanders 84 89